History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from Retrenchment to Resurgence: 1997 to 2006

Series Editor

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Cover photo: UN Photo #136694 by Fred Noy. Major General L.K.F. Aprezi (right), Force Commander of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), shaking hands with Marthinus Vanstaden, South African Officer leading UN military and police officers, on arrival in Darfur, Sudan. 28 December 2006.

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Method of Study

This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:

- Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course. Notice the lesson and section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.

- The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.

- Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.

- Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.

- At the end of each lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by rereading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.

- After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

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- A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.

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LESSON

1

The Period of Retrenchment 1995-1999

UN Photo #104043 by Eskinder Debebe.

The setbacks experienced by the United Nations (UN) in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda were a backdrop to the reality of the changes in global conflicts.

In this lesson »

Lesson Objectives »

- Know the political background to the changing face of peacekeeping in the context of the failures of the 1990s.

- Understand why retrenchment in peacekeeping occurred.

- Learn the role and composition of UNTMIH.

- Learn the role and composition of MIPONUH.

- Gain a basic knowledge of MICAH.

- Learn the role and composition of MINUGUA.

- Learn the role and composition of MONUA.

- Gain a basic knowledge of UNOA and UNMA.

A view of the United Nations Headquarters in New York, seen from the snow-covered North Garden. 5 January 1996. UN Photo #31502 by Evan Schneider.

Section 1.1 Peacekeeping in the Early 1990s

The setbacks experienced by the United Nations (UN) in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda were a backdrop to the reality of the changes in global conflicts. Conflicts were now in many cases intra-state or failed state scenarios where the conflicting groups did not necessarily represent traditional political actors. Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other missions to a lesser extent suffered from rapidly changing tasks in a complex multidimensional operation. Nonetheless, the UN continued to deploy the majority of its peacekeepers with only basic military skills required in traditional peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeepers for the most part lacked the training and skills to perform human rights, civil policing, electoral assistance, refugee relief, and post-conflict society building tasks.

It is worthwhile to remember that the term "peacekeeping" does not exist in the UN Charter. Dag Hammarskjold referred to it as "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (Chapter VI), and more forceful action, such as embargos and military intervention (Chapter VII).

Peacekeeping operations had traditionally involved the deployment of primarily military personnel from a number of countries under UN command to help control and resolve armed conflict between hostile parties who had mutually agreed to peace or at least a ceasefire. The Cold War model of peacekeeping generally dealt with inter-state conflicts. By the early 1990s, this simply was not the case. Conflicts of the 1990s frequently took place between multiple armed factions with different political objectives and fractured lines of command. In turn, irregular forces and militias in these conflicts ignored or wilfully violated humanitarian rights, while at the same time there were constantly shifting lines of confrontation. In this volatile and complex environment, peacekeepers found themselves in situations where ceasefire agreements were ignored, where consent to the UN's presence was challenged, and where government and state institutions had ceased to function or had totally broken down. In effect, there was no peace to keep.

Section 1.2   Retrenchment of Peacekeeping in the Mid-1990s

By the mid-1990s, the UN had begun to respond to the changed nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions now were characterized by complex operations composed of military, civilian police, and other civilian personnel. Many new mandates now included the creation or rehabilitation of political institutions, the provision of emergency relief, demobilization of former combatants and their reintegration into society, clearing mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO), the organization and conduct of elections, and the promotion of sustainable development practices.

Nonetheless, the spectre of the failures during the 1990s resulted in a retrenchment of peacekeeping in the second half of the decade. As peacekeeping grew in the early 1990s, so did the UN's costs, and the largest missions, with the biggest costs, soon became the biggest controversies. Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were prime examples of the evolution of peacekeeping into "nation-building" in failed state scenarios. But as these missions became obvious failures, there was a growing push in the mid-1990s, mainly by the United States (US), to shift responsibility for peace operations from the UN to regional organizations and military coalitions. As NATO took over in the Balkans in the form of its Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR), the US essentially drove a contraction of UN-led peacekeeping.

In 1995, the numbers of peacekeeping personnel declined sharply, mainly as a result of the end of the mandates of UNOSOM II in March and UNPROFOR in December. As of January 1996, the total deployment of the military and civilian police personnel stood at approximately 29,000, less than half of its previous levels. These numbers continued to decline from 1996 until the middle of 1999 when they dropped to approximately 12,000. The trend was reversed towards the latter part of 1999 with the deployment of large missions in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. The total military and civilian police strength stood at approximately 38,000 at the end of 2000.

Another unforeseen impact of the tempo of peacekeeping missions was the effect it had on western military forces that had been at the forefront of such missions. These military organizations faced a crisis; whereas the political motivation to become involved in these types of missions grew in the first half of the 1990s, the soldiers who had to conduct them became less and less motivated to go on them. This situation was further exacerbated by the differences in social values and norms between those countries and their militaries that provided contingents and the societies in which they were operating.

Members of UNIFIL remove the remains of the victims of an Israeli artillery attack that injured four of their members, and claimed the lives of more than one hundred Lebanese civilians seeking refuge in the United Nations compound. 18 April 1996. UN Photo #191066 by Hassan Siklawi.

Peacekeeping in the types of missions in the early 1990s required comprehensive training that was far greater than for war fighting, training that was not necessarily available or forthcoming. This level of complexity meant that troops had to draw on their own social values and education to access situations, which further created confusion and frustration among troops.

Added to this complex brew was that these were not war fighting missions, yet there was fighting going on and UN peacekeepers were taking casualties. This further added to the growing unwillingness of soldiers to go on missions and conversely led to contributing western states to reconsider their commitments.

Peacekeeping costs also fluctuated significantly in the 1990s. From a $0.4 billion budget in 1991, the costs rose to an all-time high of $3.6 billion in 1993. Subsequently, peacekeeping budgets decreased in the latter part of the decade and dropped to 1.0 billion in 1998. The other trend that became apparent was the shift in troops contributions from developed countries to those of developing countries. For example, in early 1991, of the top ten troop contributors, only two were developing countries: Ghana and Nepal. By the end of 2000, eight out of the top ten contributors were developing countries: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

Section 1.3   The Changed Face of Peacekeeping

The goal of peacekeeping—to alleviate human suffering and to create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace—has not changed, but the 1990s changed how it was done.

Peacekeeping operations now tended to consist of several components, including a military component, which might or might not be armed, and various civilian components encompassing a broad range of disciplines. Depending on the mission's mandate, the following were the basic goals of the mission:

- Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;

- Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;

- Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and

- Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development.

Section 1.4   Missions During the First Period of Retrenchment

In the aftermath of the major peacekeeping failures of the early 1990s, a number of smaller missions were initiated in the latter half of the 1990s. During 1997, the UN initiated four new, but small missions: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH); United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH); United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA); and United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). Where applicable, these missions' follow-on civilian missions are covered in detail in the balance of this lesson.

Section 1.5   United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)

Background to UNTMIH

For the first time in the history of Haiti, a peaceful transition of power between two democratically elected presidents, Jean Bertrand Aristide and René Garcia Préval, occurred in February 1996. The Secretary-General and President Préval shared the view that a full 12 months would be needed for the Haitian National Police (HNP) to be able to ensure a secure and stable environment without international support.

UNTMIH was the third in the series of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti. The previous missions were the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), from September 1993 to June 1996, and the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), from July 1996 to 31 July 1997. UNMIH was effectively suspended from October 1993 but was reactivated in March 1995 after the Multinational Force (September 1994-March 1995) had established a secure and stable environment.

Establishment of UNTMIH

The Security Council established UNTMIH on the basis of a July 1997 report by the Secretary-General (S/1997/564). It was established by Security Council resolution 1123 (1997) of 30 July 1997 for a single four-month period ending on 30 November 1997.

In the report, the Secretary-General stated that Haiti had taken significant strides forward. Nevertheless, the country continued to face daunting political and economic challenges. The basic consensus among Haitians for the reforms required to strengthen democratic institutions, generate economic growth, and create jobs had yet to be built. Progress had also been made with regard to the establishment and training of the new police force; however, progress was slow. The Secretary-General shared the view of Haiti's political leaders that without steady and long-term support from the international community, the force might not be able to cope with serious incidents, risking deterioration in the security situation.

Role of UNTMIH

The goal of UNTMIH was to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Tasks of UNTMIH's police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and palace security, areas considered to be of distinct importance. Once reinforced, these units would considerably improve HNP's effectiveness while it pursued its own development. UNTMIH and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued preparation of an assistance programme to provide the HNP with law enforcement expertise.

Tasks of UNTMIH's military security element included ensuring, under the authority of the Force Commander, the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel implementing the mandate. The Special Representative continued to coordinate the activities of the UN system to promote institution building, national reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation.

Organization of UNTMIH

The new mission was composed of both military and civilian police elements that would continue to support the Haitian authorities in the further professionalization of HNP. The Secretary-General's Special Representative continued to coordinate UN activities in Haiti related to institution-building, national reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation. Total UN forces numbered 1,200 military personnel, including about 650 Canadians, and 550 Pakistanis.

Humanitarian Work

Both the Canadian and Pakistani contingents were involved in humanitarian work during the mission. Members of the Canadian contingent became involved in voluntary humanitarian work on several projects including the distribution of humanitarian aid to schools, dispensaries, hospitals, and orphanages.

Termination of UNTMIH

On 29 August 1997, Canada handed over the task of guarding the National Presidential Palace to the HNP. On 30 November 1997, the mission officially stood down and ceased operations, and Canadian personnel returned to Canada over the following month.

The Security Council resolution 1141 of 28 November 1997, established the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) with the mandate to continue work to support the Haitian National Police. MIPONUH was terminated in March 2000 and was succeeded by the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) on 16 March 2000.

MICAH was established by the UN General Assembly resolution A/54/193 of 17 December 1999. It was mandated to consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions. Moreover, MICAH was tasked with further promoting human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary, and with coordinating and facilitating the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.

The Canadian Contingent

FORMATION	ROLE
A small infantry battalion, from the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment	Conducted patrols and other operations in Port-au-Prince and throughout Haiti
A helicopter squadron, from 430 Tactical Helicopter Squadron	Equipped with five CH-146 Griffon helicopters and two Mi-8 (Russian civilian helicopters under contract in support of the mission), which provided the UN force with casualty evacuation, a day/night mission capability, and a medium airlift transportation capability
A military police platoon	Provided criminal investigation services
A Military Information Support Team, from 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (5 CMBG)	Provided accurate UN information to the population
A logistics group, from 5 CMBG with elements from air and maritime units across Canada. It included a maintenance platoon, a transportation platoon, a medical platoon, an administrative and headquarters section, and an engineer troop	Provided support services to administer and sustain Canadian units deployed with UNTMIH
More than 50 Canadian civilian police officers	Participated in the mission as part of the United Nations Civil Police (CIVPOL) contingent

Section 1.6   United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)

Background to MIPONUH

Near the end of UNTMIH's mandate, on 29 October 1997, the President of Haiti, Mr. René Préval, wrote to the Secretary-General thanking the UN for its contribution to the consolidation of Haitian democracy. President Préval noted that all UN military forces would soon depart the country. At the same time, he said that it was important to continue working to strengthen the police force. He also expressed his confidence that Haiti would be able to continue to count on UN support in the new stage of its effort at national reconstruction.

The UN has undertaken a number of peacekeeping missions in Haiti. MIPONUH was preceded by, in reverse order: the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) (August to November 1997), the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) (July 1996 to July 1997), and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (September 1993 to June 1996).

Premised in President Préval's request and after consultations with Member States, on 20 November 1997, the Secretary-General recommended a follow-on mission and a concept of operations. (S/1997/832/Add.2). Based on the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council adopted resolution 1141 (1997) of 28 November 1997, which established MIPONUH. By the same resolution, the Council affirmed the importance of a professional, self-sustaining, fully functioning national police of adequate size and structure, able to conduct the full spectrum of police functions, including the consolidation of democracy and the revitalization of Haiti's system of justice. It encouraged Haiti to pursue its plans in those respects. Unlike the three previous missions, MIPONUH had no military component. Its mandate was to continue the work of the UN to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) and to contribute to its professionalization.

Role of MIPONUH

MIPONUH's main task was to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the HNP. MIPONUH, which succeeded the previous United Nations Missions in Haiti in December 1997, placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in their day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by the UNDP and bilateral donors. MIPONUH's special police unit was tasked with providing assistance to MIPONUH personnel and protecting its property.

Organization of MIPONUH

MIPONUH was composed of up to 300 civilian police officers, including a 90-strong special police unit (SPU), and necessary support personnel. On 21 February 2000, the civilian police element comprised 219 officers from 10 countries.

MIPONUH deployed its civilian police element throughout Haiti's nine departments, while the SPU was based in Port-au-Prince. The special police provided security for mission personnel and property on a 24-hour basis.

Canada provided spare parts, tools for the SPU, and six Bison armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as well as associated support personnel (five maintenance personnel and four driving instructors) from Canada.

HNP Training

MIPONUH attained its training objectives established for the Mission by the Director- General of the Haitian National Police in November 1999. MIPONUH continued to provide additional courses, in particular in the areas of border police operations, crowd control, and first aid. The emphasis was on the training of trainers.

At the same time, CIVPOL officers continued to discharge their mentoring responsibilities on the offices of the Director-General and Inspector-General of the Haitian National Police, as well as with the departmental directors of HNP. The emphasis remained on community policing, the maintenance of law and order, the fight against capital crimes and drug trafficking, and the reinforcing of police administration and logistics.

Training for HNP crowd-control units (Compagnies d'intervention et de maintien de l'ordre) was continued. Training ended on 25 February 2000 with the completion by 46 HNP officers of a crowd control course. MIPONUH continued its cooperation with bilateral programmes for police training, such as the ones sponsored by Canada, France, and the United States.

Composition of MIPONUH, 21 February 2000

Country	SPU	CIVPOL
Argentina	110	
Benin		5
Canada		17
France		30
Mali		15
Niger		3
Senegal		6
Togo		7
Tunisia		3
USA		23
Subtotal	110	109
TOTAL	**219**	

The HNP

The HNP faced a number of problems during the time MIPONUH was operational. Various assassination attempts against the judiciary and the HNP, and other acts of aggression against members of the police service created a crisis in morale. But by late 1999, this situation had improved even though 20 officers had been killed in the line of duty. By November 1999, the number of capital crimes against police officers declined, and the number of police officers accused of human rights violations and other instances of inappropriate or criminal conduct also declined.

Overall, the security situation at the end of December 1999 was problematic. However, the HNP had been able to work with increased efficiency. Command structures had been reorganized and the terms of reference for senior-level were revised. Forty-six additional officers for crowd-control units were deployed and 85 new vehicles were added to the HNP fleet. The government funded 50 of the new vehicles and 35 were funded by the UNDP through a donation from the Japanese Government. This resulted in the HNP undertaking several successful operations in the fight against delinquency and drug trafficking. The HNP was able to provide adequate security during election-related events.

Termination of MIPONUH

Overall, between 1995 and 2000, with the assistance of the international community, the Government of Haiti gave priority to the institutional development of the HNP, with increasingly positive results in the areas of organization, effectiveness, and credibility. However, by March 2000, the HNP had become the target of renewed attacks and there was some politicization of the HNP.

A task force was first established in 1999 to plan the orderly withdrawal and liquidation of MIPONUH. By early February 2000, the withdrawal plans for the Mission's CIVPOL personnel were finalized. All CIVPOL personnel were repatriated by 15 March 2000 when the Mission's mandate ended. The liquidation of assets was completed by the end of June 2000 with certain assets being given to the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH).

MICAH succeeded MIPONUH on 16 March 2000. The establishment of MICAH was approved by the General Assembly in resolution A/54/193 of 17 December 1999. MICAH's mandate was to consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions of the UN. Also, MICAH was to consolidate those results achieved by the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), which was a joint undertaking of the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote respect for human rights in Haiti. MICAH's role was to further the promotion of human rights and the reinforcement of the institutional effectiveness of the HNP and the judiciary. MICAH was also to coordinate and facilitate the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.

MICAH consisted of some 80 non-uniformed UN technical advisors providing advice and material assistance in policing, justice, and human rights to the Haitian Government and to a support staff of some 20. MICAH's mandate ended on 7 February 2001, coinciding with the end of the Préval administration. It was argued in some quarters that the focus on returning Aristide to power had eclipsed the main goal of anchoring democratic institutions in Haiti. Moreover, it has been argued that the UN reduced its involvement in Haiti too early by cutting MICAH short due to frustration with the performance of the Haitian government in implementing programmes, and the ongoing violence and instability. MICAH had barely begun to operate when it was withdrawn.

Section 1.7   United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)

Background to MINUGUA

Thirty-six years of internal conflict in Guatemala, which had left 100,000 dead and a further 40,000 missing, came to an end on 29 December 1996 when the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) signed the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. The agreement brought into effect a number of previous agreements negotiated over a period of six years under UN auspices. The UN was already verifying one of those, the 1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights. At the request of the parties, and without awaiting a ceasefire and the conclusion of the negotiating process, the UN General Assembly (A/RES/48/267), on 19 September 1994, established the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA).

MINUGUA'S Mandate

The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala—the peacekeeping mission within the larger civilian and humanitarian MINUGUA mission—was established by the Security Council in resolution 1094 (1997) on 20 January 1997 for a three-month period to verify the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the URNG, which was signed at Oslo on 4 December 1996.

Verification functions under the Oslo Agreement (S/1996/1045) included observation of a formal cessation of hostilities, the separation and concentration of the respective forces of forces, and the disarmament and demobilization of URNG combatants in assembly points specifically prepared for this purpose. MINUGUA was to carry out verification and institution- building activities throughout the country.

Organization of MINUGUA

More than 250 human rights monitors, legal experts, indigenous specialists, and police were posted throughout Guatemala, including in its remotest areas. Their presence and verification activities focused public attention on human rights and the related problem of impunity, reinforcing the declining trend in political violence.

The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established to verify fulfilment of the provisions of the agreement on the definitive cease-fire, signed by the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) on 4 December 1996. 1 January 1997. UN Photo #84985 by John Olsson.

Once the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire was signed on 4 December 1996 at Oslo, the Security Council, by resolution 1094 (1997) of 20 January 1997, decided to attach to MINUGUA a group of 155 UNMOs and requisite medical personnel for a three-month period. Although the expanded mission continued to be known as MINUGUA, its official name was changed to the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala in order to reflect the new mandate. The functions of the observer group were to verify compliance by the Government of Guatemala and URNG with the Agreement on the definitive ceasefire, including the formal cessation of hostilities, the separation and concentration of the respective forces, and disarmament and demobilization of former URNG combatants. Eventually, 132 UNMOs were deployed with 13 military medical personnel (3-Austria, 5-Germany, and 5-Singapore).

Deployment and Role of the UNMO Groups

The Agreement provided for the formal ceasefire to enter into force as of 00:00 hours on D-day, on which date the UNMO group, as the verification authority, was ready to assume its responsibilities. On 13 February 1997, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the operation it had mandated could begin on 3 March 1997, following completion of the preparatory work for the deployment of the group and the establishment of the URNG assembly points. Until then, the parties maintained the informal ceasefire that they had observed since 19 March 1996.

On Day-15 (16 February 1997), URNG provided information on 3,570 personnel to be demobilized. It also provided an inventory of the weapons, explosives, and mines in its possession and information on the location of remaining minefields. The Guatemalan Army, for its part, provided the requisite list of units that were to be redeployed to their bases. On Day-10 (21 February 1997), members of the UNMO group were deployed to the six verification centres (Finca Sacol, Finca Claudia, Finca Las Abejas, Tululché, Tzalbal, and Mayalán) responsible for monitoring the eight URNG assembly points. In addition, two sector headquarters and a main headquarters were set up to provide command and control. The UNMO group became fully operational on 3 March 1997, and on that date, the formal ceasefire entered into force.

Members of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) wait to receive certificates after completing a demobilization process, where they obtained skills which will prepare them for civilian life. 1 January 1997. UN Photo #106681 by John Olsson.

The separation of forces between the Guatemalan Army and URNG was carried out through the establishment of two concentric areas, security zones, and coordination zones around each URNG assembly point. Army units were not permitted to enter the security zone and police units could only do so after coordinating their movements with the MINUGUA UNMO group. As former combatants concentrated in the assembly points, their weapons, munitions, explosives, mines, and related military equipment were registered and handed over to UNMOs for storage.

Demobilization

In all, 2,928 URNG combatants were demobilized and issued temporary identification cards, and 535,102 weapons and rounds of ammunition were handed over to the MINUGUA. Identification cards were also issued to other URNG not required to be concentrated. Still, MINUGUA personnel, following the repatriation of the UNMO group, documented other eligible URNG members. On 14 May 1997, URNG weapons, munitions and equipment, as well as the lists of destroyed explosive devices, were delivered to the Ministry of the Interior. The corresponding handover certificate was signed by the government and by the MINUGUA Chief Military Observer. This last act signalled the completion of the mandate of the military observer group.

Although demining was not foreseen in the Agreement, URNG helped to identify and clear all its minefields, in particular those located on the Volcan Tajumulco. By 18 April 1997, 378 mines and explosive devices had been lifted and destroyed.

Termination of MINUGUA

Reporting (S/1997/432) to the Security Council on 4 June 1997 on the activities of the UNMO Group/MINUGUA, the Secretary-General noted that the exemplary manner in which the Agreement on the definitive ceasefire had been implemented was "above all a testimony to the determination of both the Government of Guatemala and URNG to put an end to the bitter armed conflict between them."

The Secretary-General continued by saying that credit for the success achieved in the ceasefire process was also due to the international community which showed its own determination to put its resources and experience at the service of the demobilization of URNG combatants. He acknowledged in particular the role of the European Union (EU), USAID, OAS, and the UN programmes and agencies that took the lead in providing logistical and other support to the demobilization process, as well as that of the many governments that contributed to this concerted effort.

The Secretary-General paid tribute to all the military and civilian personnel who served with distinction in the United Nations military observer group "for the successful completion of their tasks and the significant contribution they have made to the Guatemalan peace process." Following the repatriation of MINUGUA's UNMOs, MINUGUA continued its other verification and institution-building activities in support of the peace process in Guatemala, until the mission was successfully terminated at the end of 2004.

Weapons Turned in to MINUGUA by the URNG

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	NUMBER
Small arms (assault rifles, light machine guns [LMGs] etc.)	1,665
Crew-served weapons (includes RPGs, mortars etc)	159
TOTAL	1,824
Small calibre munitions (up to 12 mm)	534,955
Grenades (including RPG and mortar rounds)	147
TOTAL	535,102
Mines	1,390
Munitions (includes aviation bombs, rockets, various grenades)	934
Explosives	1,720 kg
Explosive cords	380 mm
Other explosive devices	3,480

Source: UN S/1997/432 Annex 3 p. 10 and "Guatemala Peace Process," Central America Update, 26 April 1997.

A Stockpile of ammunition which was turned in by the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) at Tzabal base camp. 1 January 1997. UN Photo #37161 by John Olsson.

Section 1.8   United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)

Background to MONUA

Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, the peace process in Angola achieved progress, resulting in a period of relative peace in the country. Active dialogue between the government and UNITA was maintained at various levels and led to the formation of the joint armed forces (FAA) and the national police force (ANP), as well as the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN).

With the completion of many tasks by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), Security Council resolution 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997 established its successor mission: the United Nations Observer Mission (MONUA).

Mandate and Role of MONUA

MONUA's overall mandate was to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development, and rehabilitation of the country. The mission had a number of components to its mandate; they are detailed below.

Political Aspects

MONUA's Division of Political Affairs would assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in implementing the political mandate of the mission. The Division would also:

- Monitor the normalization of State administration throughout the country;

- Provide good offices and mediation at the provincial and local levels, and participate in the official organs established for that purpose;

- Monitor and verify the integration of UNITA elements into state structures, as provided for in the Lusaka Protocol and subsequent agreements between the government and UNITA, and assist in the resolution and management of conflicts which may arise; and

- Promote, in coordination with other components, a climate of confidence and national accord by establishing a presence in major population areas and areas of tension.

Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette (left) meets with Major-General Philip Valerio Sibanda, the outgoing Force Commander of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). 12 May 1998. UN Photo #165838 by Evan Schneider.

Police Matters

With the withdrawal of United Nations military personnel and the gradual normalization of state administration over the entire Angolan territory, the civilian police component of MONUA would:

- Verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police;

- Verify the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police;

- Verify the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police;

- Verify the free circulation of people and goods;

- Give special attention to respect for civil and political rights and freedoms;

- Carry out joint patrols with the Angolan National Police, especially in areas formerly controlled by UNITA;

- Inspect prisons and, if need be, establish its temporary presence at national police posts and stations;

- Monitor and verify the collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population;

- Supervise proper storage or destruction of these weapons; and

- Oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders.

Human Rights Issues

The human rights component of MONUA would:

- Contribute to the promotion of human rights and prevention of their abuse in the country;

- Help develop the capacity of national institutions and non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights; and

- Investigate adequately allegations of abuses and initiate appropriate action.

Military Aspects

The military component of MONUA would:

- Verify compliance with various aspects of the ceasefire regime;

- Investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the presence of any UNITA armed elements, and the existence of weapons caches;

- Monitor and dismantle checkpoints and UNITA command posts; and

- Monitor the integration of UNITA soldiers into the Angola Armed Forces.

Humanitarian Aspects

The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit would:

- Support the demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants and their social reintegration;

- Monitor the emergency situation and maintain a capacity to respond to humanitarian needs as they emerge; and

- Serve as the focal point for information, donor liaison, and coordination of humanitarian operations through an established network of field advisors in key provinces.

The Planned Deployment of MONUA

According to the original plan, United Nations military personnel would be gradually withdrawn as state administration was extended throughout the country. MONUA's civilian police component would continue to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, as well as the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police. The unit would also monitor the collection of weapons from civilians, supervise their proper storage or destruction, and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. After the withdrawal of the main infantry units, a reduced number of military observers would be retained in Angola to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the presence of any UNITA armed elements, and the existence of weapons caches.

The initial mandate of MONUA extended to 31 October 1997, with the expectation that the mission would be completed by 1 February 1998. In the following months, however, the Angolan peace process proceeded much slower than expected. As a result, many of the activities of MONUA concentrated on the residual tasks of UNAVEM III. The three major pending tasks, namely the demilitarization of UNITA forces, the normalization of state administration throughout the national territory, and the transformation of the UNITA radio remained to be completed. Also, the continuing existence of armed UNITA elements, the difficulties related to the coexistence of local authorities and UNITA militants, and the need to stabilize the political situation represented serious challenges to national reconciliation and reconstruction. The United Nations, with the support of the three observer states (Portugal, Soviet Union, and United States), continued to play a pivotal role in helping the two signatories to the Lusaka Protocol overcome their deep-rooted mutual mistrust.

The First Extensions of the Mandate

By mid-1997, the peace process in Angola had experienced some very serious difficulties. Based on the Secretary-General's recommendations, on 29 October 1997, Security Council resolution 1135 (1997) postponed the withdrawal of UN military units and extended the mandate of MONUA until 31 January 1998. The Security Council went on to deplore UNITA's failure to comply fully with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, and in turn, imposed sanctions on UNITA, including restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel.

By January 1998, the down-sizing of MONUA's military component had begun, but due to continued instability, there was a need to retain a UN military task force. On 27 January 1998, Security Council resolution 1149 (1998) extended MONUA's mandate until 30 April and established a military task force composed of four infantry companies including some 910 support troops, 45 military staff officers, and 90 UNMOs.

The Security Council extends the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) for one month until 15 September. Members of the Council vote unanimously to adopt resolution 1190 (1998). 13 August 1998. UN Photo #183719 by Evan Schneider.

On 29 April, due to continuing problems with UNITA's lack of cooperation in disarming, and its continued attacks against UN, government, and other personnel, the Security Council again extended MONUA's mandate until 30 June 1998. The complete withdrawal of all UN military personnel, with the exception of an infantry company, support units, and 90 military observers, was set for 1 July 1998.

On 12 June 1998, the Security Council took action in resolution 1173 (1998). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided that all states would freeze funds and property belonging to UNITA, and would prevent all official contacts with the UNITA leadership in areas of Angola to which state administration had not been extended.

The Security Situation Deteriorates

On 17 June 1998, the Secretary-General reported that, despite strenuous efforts of his Special Representative Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, no progress had been achieved in the implementation of one of the last major tasks under the Lusaka Protocol, namely, the normalization of state administration throughout the country. There had also been a very dangerous deterioration of the security situation in various parts of Angola involving armed attacks by UNITA forces. Much of the blame for the resurgence of violence fell at the feet of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. Eight out of the 18 Angolan provinces had been affected and this had seriously undermined the peace process and caused a major deterioration of the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country. The total number of displaced people in Angola climbed to almost 1.3 million, and thousands had fled to neighbouring countries.

The Secretary-General joined the Security Council in its strong appeal to UNITA to cooperate with the United Nations in the immediate extension of state administration through the national territory and recommended that the mandate of MONUA be extended for two months, until 31 August 1998, and that the strength of the Mission be maintained at the existing level.

Ongoing negotiations between Mr. Beye and UNITA's leadership, after much delay and stalling, led to a promise by UNITA for normalization before 30 June 1998. The Security Council, as a gesture of goodwill, temporarily postponed the sanctions stipulated in resolution 1173 (1998); however, Mr. Beye, five MONUA staff, and two UN pilots were killed when his plane crashed on 26 June. Though negotiations continued, they went nowhere. Mr. Issa B.Y. Diallo, who arrived in Luanda on 28 August 1998, replaced Mr. Beye.

In the meantime, the withdrawal of MONUA's military component resumed as per Security Council resolution 1164 (1998) of 29 April 1998, but given the deteriorating situation, the mandate of MONUA was further extended through 31 August 1998. At the same time, the military and security situation in the country deteriorated further and a resumption of full-scale war was likely. UNITA clearly had retained a substantial military capability.

Due to the continued insecurity, the down-sizing of MONUA's military component was temporarily suspended. However, the Portuguese logistic company of 93 personnel was repatriated in July, as requested by its national authorities. The Mission's strength at the beginning of August 1998 was 728 military personnel, composed of 414 troops belonging to three infantry companies, 185 military support personnel, 37 staff officers, and 92 UNMOs. On 13 August 1998, the Security Council, by its resolution 1190 (1998) extended MONUA until 15 September 1998 and demanded that UNITA stop all attacks and cease its reoccupation of localities where state administration had been established.

In the following weeks, the peace process in Angola stalled completely. The security was especially bad in the northern and north-eastern regions where government and UNITA forces continued to conduct extensive military operations. Given the continuing instability in Angola, during September-October, the Security Council extended the mandate of MONUA three more times until 26 February 1999. The Council further stressed that there was no military solution to the conflict in Angola, and it called upon the government and UNITA to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

The Downing of UN Aircraft

However, after the crash and disappearance of UN Flight 806 over UNITA-controlled territory in central Angola in December 1998, as well as the disappearance of another aircraft, the Security Council demanded that UNITA immediately respond to the appeals from the UN. These included UNITA's guarantee of the security and access necessary for the search for, and rescue of, possible survivors of the plane incidents in territory controlled by UNITA.

After the downing of UN Flight 806A on 2 January 1999 by UNITA, bringing to six the number of aircraft lost in this area in recent months, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council demanded in resolution 1221 (1999) of 12 January 1999 that all such attacks cease immediately. Despite the resolution, neither the dos Santos government, which cited the security situation outside of government controlled territory, nor UNITA, who had downed many of the aircraft, made any rescue efforts.

Termination of MONUA's Mandate

By mid-January 1999, Angola had collapsed back into a state of war. The worsening security situation meant that MONUA could no longer carry out its mandate. Moreover, the Angolan government did not support the extension of MONUA beyond February 1999; thus, all MONUA team sites and regional headquarters were withdrawn to the capital Luanda by mid-February and most of the UN military, police, and civilian personnel were repatriated by 20 March. An infantry company of 200 personnel remained during this period to protect UN property during the first months of liquidation.

On 24 February 1999, the Secretary-General reported on the technical liquidation of MONUA. On 26 February 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1229 (1999). It decided that the human rights component of MONUA would continue its activities during the liquidation period.

The Follow-On Missions

On 15 October 1999, the Security Council resolution 1268 authorized the establishment of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) to liaise with the political, military, police, and other civilian authorities in that country. The Office was to explore effective measures for restoring peace and assist the Angolan people in the area of support capacity-building projects, including human rights training of army and police, facilitating access to the judicial system, monitoring prison conditions, and supporting media programs. In addition, the mission would support humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights, and the coordination of other activities. The government restricted the UNOA to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building, while it prosecuted its policy of "peace through war."

Security Council resolution 1433 of 15 August 2002 authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) as a follow-on mission to the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA). A resident special representative of the secretary-general was appointed to complete the outstanding tasks under the 1994 Lusaka Peace Agreement. UNMA assisted the Angolan government in ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights.

UNMA's mandate was to assist the parties in concluding the Lusaka Protocol by chairing the Joint Commission, and leading the completion of the agreed list of tasks which remain pending under the Lusaka Protocol. The Mission was also to assist the Government of Angola in undertaking the following tasks:

- Protection and promotion of human rights, and in the building of institutions to consolidate peace and enhance the rule of law;

- Provision of technical advice and support for mine action;

- Facilitation and coordination of delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons and families in quartering areas, with special concern for children and women;

- Support for social and professional reintegration of the demobilized through appropriate United Nations agencies;

- Promotion of economic recovery through relevant United Nations agencies;

- Mobilization of resources of the international community, to include international donors conferences, as appropriate; and

- Provision of technical assistance to the Government of Angola in the preparation of elections.

The war finally ended in 2002 when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed by government troops. Mainly because the government had won the war, by the end of 2002, the Government of Angola and UNITA completed the implementation of the political aspects of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Agreement. With this event, UNMA, which had had a limited role, completed its mandated political tasks and was terminated in mid-February 2003. Responsibility for residual tasks called for by the Security Council—in areas such as human rights, mine action, humanitarian assistance, economic recovery, and electoral assistance—was transferred to United Nations specialized agencies based in Angola.

End-of-Lesson Quiz »

1. **What did UN peacekeepers for the most part lack on missions in the immediate wake of the Cold War?**

    A. The training and skills to perform human rights, civil policing, electoral assistance, refugee relief, and post-conflict society building tasks

    B. The appropriate equipment to complete their tasks

    C. Political support for such complex missions

    D. Appropriate training, skills, and equipment to fulfil their missions

2. **Dag Hammarskjold referred to peacekeeping operations as:**

    A. A good idea

    B. A pointless effort

    C. "Chapter Six and a Half" operations in the context of the UN Charter

    D. The true role of the UN, even if peacekeeping was not in the Charter

3. **What impact did the peacekeeping failures of the early 1990s have on the UN?**

    A. There was no impact, and the status quo prevailed

    B. The UN stopped doing peacekeeping

    C. The UN expanded its peacekeeping into even bigger nation-building operations

    D. It resulted in a retrenchment of peacekeeping in the second half of the decade

4. **What was the role of UNTMIH?**

    A. To assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the HNP

    B. To establish a stable, political environment in Haiti to allow for elections

    C. To disarm and disband the various armed factions in Haiti

    D. To assist in the rehabilitation of Haiti's destroyed infrastructure and create a new Haitian armed forces

5. **Unlike the three previous peacekeeping missions to Haiti, MIPONUH did not include _____.**

    A. A military component

    B. A CIVPOL component

    C. A mandate from the Security Council

    D. Financing from the UN

6. **In the context of the role of MIPONUH, the mission placed special emphasis on _____.**

    A. Demining and disarming criminal organizations

    B. Humanitarian relief and social rehabilitation

    C. Assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units

    D. Electoral procedures and the holding of free and fair elections

Answer Key provided on the next page.

End-of-Lesson Quiz »

7. **To whom did the UNMOs of MINUGUA turn over the URNG's weapons, munitions, and equipment?**

    A. They did not turn anything over as all items were destroyed

    B. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General

    C. An Explosive Ordinance Disposal team from UNHQ

    D. The Ministry of the Interior

8. **What was one aspect of MONUA's overall mandate?**

    A. To assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation

    B. To enforce the peace as required in maintaining stability

    C. To assist the OAU peace force in keeping the peace

    D. To stop all illegal activity in the country.

9. **Why was the mandate of MONUA extended several times?**

    A. It was requested by both parties to the peace accord

    B. UNITA requested it as government forces were attacking it

    C. It was required due to the continued instability in the country and the escalating violence

    D. It was required by the initial Security Council resolution that established the Mission

10. **Why was MONUA eventually withdrawn?**

    A. Angola collapsed back into a state of war, and MONUA could no longer carry out its mandate

    B. It ran out of funding

    C. Both parties in the conflict demanded its withdrawal

    D. A renewal of the mandate was vetoed by the US

Answer Key »

1. A
2. C
3. D
4. A
5. A
6. C
7. D
8. A
9. C
10. A

Appendix A: List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AEC	African Economic Community
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in the Sudan
AO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Armoured Personnel Carriers
APPMs	Armed Political Parties and Movements
AU	African Union
AUSBATT	Australian Battalion
BIMa	Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BONUCA	UN Peace-Building Support Office in Central African Republic
C34	Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CAS	Civil Affairs Section
CCCAR	Canadian Contingent CAR
CCOS	Coordination Centre for Security Operations
CDF	Civil Defence Forces
CDU	Conduct and Discipline Unit
CEI	Independent Electoral Commission
CENI	National Independent Electoral Commission
CFA	Central Fiscal Authority

CFSP	Common Foreign & Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMA	Civil Military Affairs
CMAC	Civil Military Affairs Centre
CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CMOC	Civil Military Ops Centre
CMOS	Current Military Operations Service
CNDD	Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie
COE	Contingent-Owned Equipment
CONADER	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-assignment
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
CTPC/DDR	Technical Committee for Planning and Coordinating
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement
DLU	Defence Lawyers Unit
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	Eritrean Demining Authority
EEBC	Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission

EMAP	Eritrean Mine Action Programme
EO	Executive Outcomes
EOM	Election Observation Mission
ESDP	European Defence and Security Policy
ETPS	East Timor Police Service
ETTA	East Timor Transitional Administration
EU	European Union
EUFOR RD Congo	European Union Force in Congo
FAB	Forces Armees Burundaises
FANCI	National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARDC	Armed Forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDD	Forces pour la defense de la democratie
FDN	National Defence Forces
FGS	Force Generation Service
FGT	Force Generation Team
FHQ	Force HQ
FLGO	Front de Liberation du Grand Ouest
FNL	Forces nationales de liberation
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GA	General Assembly
GAF	Guinea Armed Forces
GMI	Mobile Intervention Group
GoB	Government of Burundi
GOL	Government of Liberia
GoNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan

GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GURN	Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
HAS	Humanitarian Affairs Section
HNP	Haitian National Police
HOM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
HRO	Human Rights Office
IAC	Interim Administrative Council
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMATT	International Military Assistance Training Team
IMATT-SL	International Military Assistance Training Teams Sierra Leone
IMEF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
INDBATT	Indian Battalion
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
ITS	Integrated Training Service
JCA	Japanese Cooperation Agency
JCC	Joint Ceasefire Commission
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JIAS	Joint Interim Administrative Structure
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JORBATT	Jordanian Battalion
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps

KPCT	KPC Training
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KPSS	Kosovo Police Service School
KTC	Kosovo Transitional Council
LNP	Liberia National Police
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
MCC	Military Coordination Commission
MCU	Movement Control Unit
MD	Military Division
MEO	Medical Examiner's Office
MEU	US Marine Expeditionary Unit
MICAH	International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
MISAB	Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement
MJP	Movement for Justice and Peace
MLO	Military Liaison Officer
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOU/PLANELM	MOU for participating in the Planning Element
MOU/SB	MOU for the contribution of units to the SHIRBRIG Force Pool
MOU/SC	MOU for the Steering Committee
MPCI	Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West
MPT	Military Personnel Team

MPU	Missing Persons Unit
MSC	Military Staff Committee
MSD	Medical Services Division
MSS	Medical Support Section
NAVAIDs	Navigational Aids
NCC	National Consultative Council
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NECBATT	Netherlands/Canadian Battalion
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
NZBATT	New Zealand Battalion
OAS	Organization of American States
OASEA	Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGA	Office of the General Adviser
OHQ	Operational HQ
OHRM	UN Office for Human Resources Management
OIOS	UN Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLMEE	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMPF	Office on Missing Persons and Forensics
OMS	Office of Mission Support
OO	Office of Operations
PAD	Political Affairs Division
PALIPEHUTU	Partie pour la liberation du peuple hutu

PAO	Political Affairs Office
PBPS	Peacekeeping Best Practices Section
PBPU	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
PDSRSG	Principal Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
PKF	Peacekeeping Force
PLANELM	Planning Element
PNB	Police Nationale du Burundi
PNC	Congolese National Police
PNTL	National Police
PORBATT	Portuguese Battalion
PSC	Peace and Security Council [AU]
PSC	Political and Security Committee [EU]
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Rapid Action Force
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie
RCP	Regiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes
RDL	Rapid Deployment Level
RDMHQ	Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters
RDMU	Rapid Deployment Management Unit
RDR	Rally of the Republicans
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROKBATT	Republic of Korea Battalion
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front

RUFP	RUF Party
SADC	South African Development Community
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Detachment
SAT	Standby Arrangements Team
SC	Security Council
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SCU	Serious Crimes Unit
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SG	Secretary-General
SHIRBRIG	Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLA/AW	SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPU	Special Police Unit
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TAOR	Tactical Area-of-Responsibility
TBoB	Transitional Government of Burundi
TCC	Troop-Contributing Countries
TES	Training and Evaluation Service
THAIBATT	Thai Battalion
TMK	Trupat Mbrojtese Te Kosoves
TOE	Tables of Organization and Equipment
TOPE	Training of Peer Educators

TS	Team Sites
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNATAET	United Nations Operation in East Timor
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNLO	UN Liaison Office
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola
UNMACC	UN Mine Action Coordination Centre
UNMAS	UN Mine Action Service
UNMIK TV	United Nations Mission in Kosovo Television
UNMO	UN Military Observers
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSAS	UN Standby Arrangement System
UNV	UN Volunteers
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
URUBATT	Uruguayan Guards
USGET	US Group East Timor
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance

| VCCT	Voluntary Confidential Counselling and Testing
WACPU	Women and Children's Protection Unit
WAFF	Woman Associated with the Fighting Forces
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Appendix B: Past Peacekeeping Missions

Left to Right: UN Photo #145285 by Yutaka Nagata; UN Photo #137362 by JG; UN Photo #145152; UN Photo #64265 by Milton Grant.

For information about past peacekeeping missions, visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' resource page:

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations>.

Appendix C: Current Peacekeeping Missions

UN Peacekeeping Map from the UN Cartographic Section, April 2018: <www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/P_K_O.pdf>.

» *Looking for statistics or other data about peacekeeping around the world today? Visit the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' resource page for the most up-to-date information about current peacekeeping operations and other UN missions: <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/>.*

Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination

Format and Material

The End-of-Course Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online Classroom. Most exams have 50 questions. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from all lessons of the course and may also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.

» *Access the exam from your Online Classroom by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/courses/> and clicking the title to this course. Once you arrive at the course page, click the red "Start Exam" button.*

Time Limit

There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions carefully and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one sitting, he or she may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The "Save" button is located at the bottom of the exam, next to the "Submit my answers" button. Clicking on the "Submit my answers" button will end the exam.

Passing Grade

To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade, and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be awarded a Certificate of Completion.

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